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According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, shale gas will provide 
half of the United States’ domestic gas by 2035. The United States has already 
moved from being one of the world’s largest importers of gas to being self- 
sufficient in less than a decade, bringing hundreds of thousands of jobs and 
attracting back companies that long ago left America in search of cheap manu-
facturing costs. But the increase in shale gas extraction has also had an envi-
ronmental cost. There is clear scientific evidence of leaking shale gas wells and 
induced earthquakes, and in some areas a population increasingly turning against 
the industry. The technology of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing that 
was developed in the United States is now being tried outside the United States, 
including in Europe, Argentina, and China. There are clear reasons why shale 
gas might be attractive to Europe. It may offer security of energy supply to 
some countries particularly dependent on Russian gas; it could stimulate growth 
and jobs; and it could supply a cleaner fuel than coal in power stations. How-
ever, prospective shale often underlies areas of high population density in Europe, 
and moreover, populations that are unfamiliar with onshore gas operations. 
The main challenge in Europe therefore is not mainly technological but for the 
industry to achieve a “social license” and for Government and regulations to 
be manifestly protecting the public and property.
Introduction
Shale is a fine grained, dark colored sedimentary rock 
that often contains natural gas (methane) as well as 
other gases. Its origins lie in mud deposited in sea and 
lake beds. Most of the mud is made up of stable min-
erals that are the result of advanced weathering of older 
rocks, but it also contains (often more than 10% by 
weight) organic matter that comes from plants growing 
on nearby land areas, as well as algae and plankton 
that live in the water column [1]. It is this organic 
material that, through heating and pressure supplied by 
deep burial under other later sediments, is converted 
to oil and gas through a complex series of chemical 
reactions. The temperature required is between 60°C 
and 120°C, with gas being formed at the high end of 
this range, and oil at the low end. Thus, shale can 
contain oil (known as “shale oil”) in certain geological 
circumstances and gas in others. Shale whose thermal 
history lies outside the 60–120°C range may not contain 
any oil or gas [2].
The mineral material that makes up the bulk of shale 
is very fine and very tightly packed with the result that 
oil and gas created within the shale cannot readily move 
within the rock. Unless natural fractures are present, shale 
will tend to retain its hydrocarbons. This low permeability 
is the root of the idea of unconventional hydrocarbons, 
so- called because the oil and gas industry has to resort 
to new unconventional methods to extract oil and gas. 
The main advance in the last few decades has been  hydraulic 
fracturing from long horizontal wells that target deep shale 
layers. Although hydraulic fracturing has been used for 
decades throughout the world [3], the extent to which 
the technique is being used now is unprecedented. About 
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33,000 gas wells are drilled in the United States every 
year and about 90% of these are fracked [4]. Rarely has 
a new technology produced such controversy. Cheap  energy, 
energy security, economic growth, and climate ameliora-
tion are claims made by shale gas’ advocates. Its detractors 
regard shale gas as a cause of environmental degradation, 
and also doubt whether its economic benefits are real or 
long lasting.
An important distinction to bear in mind in any discus-
sion of shale gas is that between resources and reserves. The 
first concept is the total amount of gas that in geological 
terms constitutes material of potential value. Reserve, a smaller 
amount, is the proportion of the resource that is economical 
to produce, within environmental and social limits. The 
“recovery factor” connects the two concepts in that it is the 
percentage of the resources that can become reserves.
Only Canada and the United States have a commercial 
shale gas business and proven reserves, and so considera-
tion of the effects of shale gas needs to concentrate in 
those countries.
North America
The main shale areas
The Barnett shale (Fig. 1) was the first shale to be  exploited 
on an industrial scale. It underlies 28,000 square miles 
in north- central Texas, including the city of Fort Worth. 
The core producing area is the Newark East gas field 
covering 500 square miles, with over 2400 producing wells 
and 2.7 tcf (trillion cubic feet) of proven reserves.
The Marcellus shale is an older shale covering over 75,000 
square miles of Ontario, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
West Virginia, Maryland, and Virginia with the best shale 
running in a belt from the northeast in New York, through 
northeast Pennsylvania into southwest Pennsylvania. The 
core area – where the formation exceeds 50 feet thick and 
has the right maturity – covers 50,000 square miles making 
it the largest potential shale region in North America.
The Eagle Ford shale trends across Texas from the 
Mexican border up into East Texas, in an area roughly 
Figure 1. North American shale gas areas. From the Energy Information Administration (EIA): http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/rpd/northamer_gas.jpg.
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50 miles wide and 400 miles long. Here, the shale has 
an average thickness of 250 feet. The Haynesville shale 
underlies an area of about 9000 square miles of east Texas 
and west Louisiana averaging about 200–300 feet thick 
in the main productive area. The shale is very deep in 
the area occurring 10,500–13,000 feet below the surface, 
and produces mainly gas. This makes it quite expensive 
to drill. The Haynesville shale was one of the fastest grow-
ing shale gas businesses in the United States until about 
2012 when gas prices fell and it became more difficult 
to operate profitably because of the depth. Many com-
panies shifted to more profitable shales where they could 
get oil as well as gas, for example, the Eagle Ford shale.
The Fayetteville shale is roughly the same age as the 
Barnett shale and underlies much of northern Arkansas 
and adjacent states. It produces natural gas in the central 
portion of the Arkoma basin in Van Buren and Cleburn 
counties where the shale is at a few hundred to 7000 feet 
below the surface.
In Canada, two shales are important: the Muskwa (Horn 
River) shale and the Montney shale. The Muskwa shale was 
first described in outcrop on the banks of the Horn River, 
a tributary of the Mackenzie River, in the Northwest Territories. 
In eastern British Colombia, it ranges in depth from 6300 
to 10,200 feet, averaging 8000 feet for the prospective area. 
The Montney shale in northwestern Alberta covers an area 
of ~1900 square miles at a depth ranging from 3000 to 
9000 feet, averaging 6000 feet for the prospective area.
Commercial development of North American shale began 
in north east Texas in the Barnett shale where the increase 
in wells drilled is particularly evident between 1997 and 
2009 (see [3]). The success in the Barnett shale lead quickly 
to the development of the Woodford, Fayetteville, 
Haynesville, Marcellus, and Eagle Ford shales, and also shale 
in Canada. The relative importance of the different U.S. 
shale layers in terms of production is shown in Figure 2.
Economic effects of shale gas
The Energy Information Administration’s 2011 Annual 
Energy Outlook [5] showed the recent history of shale gas 
and a projection to 2035 (Fig. 3), predicting that shale gas 
would make up almost half of U.S. natural gas production 
by 2035. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook of 2014 [6] 
indicated that the abundance of cheap shale gas is affecting 
the way that electricity is generated in the United States, 
Figure 2. The relative importance of different U.S. shale layers. From Newell 2011, presentation to the OECD, Paris.
Figure 3. U.S. natural gas production, 1990–2035 (trillion cubic feet per 
year). From the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy Outlook.
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and the balance of imports and exports of natural gas. 
Electricity generated by coal will remain the same or will 
slightly decline while gas- fired electricity generation will 
markedly increase. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook of 
2014 also forecast that exports of U.S. natural gas might 
grow, both by pipelines to Mexico and Canada, but also 
as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The United States has  already 
moved from being one of the world’s largest importers of 
gas to being self- sufficient in less than a decade [3].
Shale gas has contributed to American energy security. 
American conventional natural gas production peaked in 
the early 2000s, and the widely discussed solution to the 
shortfall was to import LNG from conventional natural 
gas fields in the Middle East, Australia, and Russia. In 
2006, there were four operating onshore LNG import 
terminals in the United States and more were expected 
to be built [3]. Since that time shale gas production has 
reduced U.S. natural gas imports to a level not seen since 
1994. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook of 2012 [7] sug-
gests that the United States will become a net exporter 
of gas in the form of LNG in 2016. More than 2 billion 
cubic feet per year may be being exported by 2019 [7].
The EIA Annual Energy Outlook of 2014 [6] predicts 
a jump in U.S. manufacturing powered by cheaper fuel 
in the form of shale gas. The main industries affected 
will be energy intensive bulk chemicals and primary met-
als, both of which provide products used by the mining 
and other downstream industries such as fabricated metals 
and machinery. The bulk chemicals industry is also a 
major user of natural gas and, increasingly, hydrocarbon 
gas liquids which are often produced with gas from shale. 
One of these is ethane which is used to make ethylene 
which in turn has many industrial products including 
PVC, polystyrene, latex, detergent, and vinyl. The Dow 
Chemical Company announced in 2012 that it would build 
a $1.7 billion ethylene and propylene production facility 
in Texas using ethane from local shale.
The low price of U.S. fuel now means that manufac-
turing costs are decreasing and companies that once left 
the United States to find cheaper production abroad are 
“reshoring” or returning production to the United States, 
which could result in 1 million more manufacturing jobs 
as companies build new factories [8]. Shale gas created 
600,000 jobs in the United States as a whole up to 2010 
and is predicted to provide 1 million jobs by 2025 [9] 
and 1.6 million by 2035 [10]. In Pennsylvania alone, the 
home of the huge Marcellus shale, the shale gas business 
is predicted to bring $18 billion extra business, nearly 
$2 billion local tax and 200,000 jobs by 2020 [11]. The 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [12] observed that between 
2007 and 2012 employment in Pennsylvania’s oil and 
natural gas industry (mainly shale gas) increased by 15,114 
(259.3%), also that while the state’s average annual pay 
increased by $5158 (11.9%), to $48,397 in 2012, wages 
in Pennsylvania’s oil and natural gas industry rose by 
$22,104 (36.3%), to $82,974 in 2012. For the United 
Kingdom recently, Ernst and Young [13] predicted 64,500 
jobs at peak for a U.K. shale gas industry of 4000 wells.
One result of the substitution of gas for coal in elec-
tricity generation is that for the years 2006–2011, CO2 
from fossil fuel consumption declined by 430 million tons 
(or 7.7%) in the United States [14]; although U.S. energy- 
related CO2 emissions increased from 5267 million tons 
in 2012 to 5396 million tons in 2013 [6].
Environment
Concerns over degradation of the environment in North 
America center on three main topics: groundwater con-
tamination by stray methane, uncontrolled emissions of 
methane to the atmosphere (fugitive emissions), and 
earthquakes directly or indirectly related to hydraulic 
fracturing. Perhaps the area that has caused most concern 
has been the first. At least two peer- reviewed papers rep-
resenting studies of groundwater in Pennsylvania close to 
hydraulic fracturing of shale have reported contamination 
of shallow water wells [15, 16].
Osborn et al. [16] described high concentrations of 
methane from water wells close to active hydraulic frac-
turing sites and used the chemical composition of the 
methane to show that it was thermogenic rather than 
biogenic, and so likely to have come from shale rather 
than shallow biological action. The paper was criticized 
(e.g., Davies [17]) for the rather small amount of sup-
porting data, and for the lack of baseline data on how 
much methane naturally occurs in water wells in 
Pennsylvania (see, e.g., [18]). However, Jackson et al. [15] 
working on the same area in Pennsylvania showed sta-
tistically significant evidence from a larger number of data 
points that water wells within 1 km of hydraulic fracturing 
wells contained high levels of stray methane. Molofsky 
et al. [18] and Molofsky et al. [19] showed that the 
methane – though clearly thermogenic shale gas – prob-
ably emanated from shale layers above the hydraulically 
fractured layer (the Marcellus shale) suggesting that 
 hydraulic fracturing was not the direct cause of stray gas, 
but that leaking or faulty production wells were [15]. 
However, large studies of areas undergoing intense 
 hydraulic fracturing elsewhere, such as the Arkansas 
Fayetteville shale, have found very low concentrations of 
only biogenic methane in water wells, suggesting that this 
leakage is a local problem for Pennsylvania [20]. Recent 
tentative evidence from study of a groundwater supply 
contamination incident in Pennsylvania showed that 
 additives probably derived from drilling or hydraulic frac-
turing fluid were present in groundwater [21].
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However, concerns over additives used in hydraulic 
fracturing fluid mainly center on them reaching the 
 environment from spills at the surface or in transport, 
from illegal dumping of wastewater, or from damage 
to the liners of wastewater impoundment dams [22]. 
Most of the hydraulic fracturing fluid is water but the 
nontoxic sand proppant is also an important addition. 
On average 0.17% of the volume of the hydraulic frac-
turing fluid is made up of other additives [23]. These 
usually include inhibitors to prevent scale on the walls 
of the well, acid to help initiate fractures, and biocide 
to kill bacteria that can produce acids that lead to 
corrosion.
In a recent survey [24], 81 common additives were 
identified and categorized according to their functions. 
Of these, 17 chemicals were considered to present potential 
treatment challenges but most of the additives were con-
sidered “nontoxic or of low toxicity” with three “classified 
as Category 2” oral toxins according to standards in the 
“Globally Harmonized System of Classification and 
Labeling of Chemicals” (see [24]). Stringfellow et al. [24] 
noted that toxicity information was not located for 30 
of the additives and recommended that further research 
and assessment was needed.
Richardson et al. [25] found that just under half of a 
survey of U.S. states permitting hydraulic fracturing cur-
rently require some form of fracturing fluid disclosure but 
the detail varies across states. Environmental groups (and 
some in industry) have suggested that states should insist 
on disclosure whether the federal government asks for it 
or not. Many companies voluntarily disclose information 
on the web database FracFocus (http://fracfocus.org/).
Howarth et al. [26] studied the methane emissions from 
the surface installations of several shale gas wells finding 
high levels of methane release into the atmosphere as a 
result of two routine processes: flow back and drill out. 
Flow back is the liquid that returns to the well and then 
to the surface following hydraulic fracturing. Typically it 
carries methane. The practice of leaving the flow back 
water in open tanks at the surface (ready for disposal or 
reuse) allows methane to escape directly into the atmos-
phere. After drill out (where plugs in the well that par-
titioned parts of the well for hydraulic fracturing are 
removed), methane also escapes from the well to the 
atmosphere. Howarth et al. [26] published data that showed 
a very high level of methane leakage of between 3% and 
8% of a well’s production over its lifetime. Given that 
methane is a potent greenhouse gas, [26] considered that 
such levels of emissions cast doubt on the claims that 
shale gas could be a low carbon fuel, for example, in 
comparison with coal. Howarth’s paper has been contested 
and recent work [27] suggested that the high figures for 
emissions quoted in the paper were unrepresentative of 
the industry as a whole. Recent work from a larger number 
of shale gas drilling sites [28] suggests that the leakage 
rate is about half of 1% of gas production.
Evidence of earthquakes caused directly by hydraulic 
fracturing is extremely rare in the United States, though 
in Canada there are well- documented cases [29]. However 
the associated activity of deep geological disposal of flow 
back water is increasingly associated with earthquakes. 
Frohlich [30] showed that flow back disposal wells in the 
Barnett shale area in northeast Texas were responsible 
for several small earthquakes and concluded that the wells 
that were near faults, and particularly faults with stress, 
were the most likely to trigger earthquakes. The few stud-
ies like these suggest that permanent underground disposal 
of waste water is much more likely to produce earthquakes 
than hydraulic fracturing mainly because the water injected 
is permanent rather than temporary and because very 
large volumes can build up underground.
Europe
The EIA [31] indicated that much of the world’s shale 
gas is probably outside of North America – in Europe, 
China, Argentina, and Mexico, though there has been 
very little development in these areas. The way that this 
resource is seen, and its potential for commercialization, 
depends largely on the individual circumstances of the 
country with regard to energy prices, energy supply  security, 
and environmental concerns.
European shale areas
The most prospective areas in Europe include the eastern 
Baltic, north- eastern Ukraine, western Ukraine, the Balkans, 
central Poland, northern Germany, parts of southern 
Norway and Sweden, Netherlands, northern France, and 
northern England. European countries with the most 
 advanced shale gas development, in terms of exploration, 
drilling, and licenses are Poland and the United Kingdom.
Poland
Poland appears to have a substantial shale gas resource 
[31]. The Polish Geological Institute [32] estimated shale 
gas resources in the range 346–768 billion cubic 
meters.
Poland also has gas supply security concerns, and as 
a member state of the European Union is part of ambi-
tious plans to reduce Europe- wide greenhouse gas emis-
sions through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
Almost 70% of Poland’s natural gas is imported (mainly 
from Russia) and almost 90% of its electricity is gener-
ated using local Polish coal [33]. There is therefore a 
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clear policy need for Poland to not only switch away 
from coal to generate electricity, but also to lower 
 dependency on Russian supplies. Shale gas is therefore 
being considered very seriously by the Government of 
Poland and much of the country is licensed for gas 
 exploration. The concession areas of exploration cover 
37,000 square kilometers, which constitutes 11% of the 
country’s territory and extend as a wide belt from 
Pomerania (northeastern Poland), through Mazowsze and 
Podlasie (central Poland), to Lubelszczyna (southeastern 
Poland) [33]. By the end of 2012, companies had drilled 
33 exploration wells and fracked 11 of those, but results 
from drilling and testing appear to have been mixed.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has three main prospective areas, 
the north of England to the east and west of the Pennine 
Hills, the central lowlands of Scotland, and the Weald in 
south- eastern England. The largest resource is within the 
Bowland–Hodder shale unit (containing 1300 tcf) in the 
north of England; the central lowlands contain 80.3 tcf 
of gas, and 6.0 billion barrels of oil; and the Weald con-
tains 4.4 billion barrels of oil [2, 34, 35].
Western European countries tend to have more diverse 
sources of energy supply than those in eastern Europe. The 
United Kingdom sources are coal, gas, and nuclear. British 
gas power stations use Norwegian gas and Qatari LNG. 
Since the peak of production from the North Sea, Britain 
has become a net gas importer and as British North Sea 
oil and gas continue to decline, dependency on imports 
will increase. Although British oil imports come mainly 
from Norway, other sources are in less stable countries and 
there is a concern that world events like the “Arab spring” 
that began in 2010, might affect Britain’s ability to source 
its energy. Thus, security of supply is a significant issue.
The United Kingdom has also committed to greenhouse 
gas reductions of 80% by 2050. Much of this reduction 
could be supplied by nuclear, but the cost of nuclear new 
build and decommissioning power stations – and the public 
dislike of them – has made their development more and 
more difficult. Another of the United Kingdom’s plans 
to reduce emissions while still using fossil fuels in power 
stations – carbon capture and storage – has been slow 
to start. The technology, which has only been proven on 
a small scale, is expensive and difficult to commercialize 
without a high price for carbon emissions per ton through 
the ETS [36]. For all these reasons the United Kingdom 
Figure 4. The two main prospective layers of shale in the North of England and their distribution with respect to population and infrastructure. From 
Andrews [2].
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government has shown interest in the development of 
shale gas and is offering support, including tax incentives. 
As of early 2014, a percentage of revenues from produc-
tion will be available to local people and local councils 
will receive an increase in the rates from operations.
Environmental concerns in Europe
The most detailed estimate for shale gas thus far in Europe 
has been that carried out in the north of the United 
Kingdom to assess the size of the resource in the Bowland–
Hodder shale layer [2]. Among the findings of the report 
were a substantial resource of 1300 tcf, very thick shale 
layers underlying parts of the north of England either 
side of the Pennine hills – and crucially a concentration 
of prospective shale under areas with relatively high popu-
lation density (Fig. 4; [2]). The cities of Manchester, 
Liverpool, Blackpool, Leeds, York, and Sheffield are all 
underlain by prospective shale as are high- value agricultural 
land and National Parks. The coincidence of populated 
areas and shale is not entirely a matter of chance since 
the Bowland–Hodder shale layer is related to the Coal 
Measures that geologically overly it. These coal deposits 
fueled the 19th Century industrial revolution that encour-
aged human settlement.
This coincidence highlights the central problem in 
Europe – that shale gas resources often underlie dense 
populations and populations that are also unused to oil 
and gas drilling, unlike in the United States and Canada. 
This is the main reason for the overall lack of support 
such that there are moratoria on drilling in several coun-
tries (e.g., France, Netherlands, Czech Republic, and 
Bulgaria); and in many others, even with substantial 
 resources, there is very slow progress in drilling.
In the United Kingdom there have also been some 
very public problems in early drilling, for example, the 
first attempts at hydraulic fracturing of the Bowland–
Hodder shale layer near Blackpool in the northwest resulted 
in a number of small earthquakes, including two above 
1.0 on the ML scale [37]. Following these in May 2011, 
hydraulic fracturing was suspended by the U.K. 
Government and an intensive study of hydraulic fracturing 
in the area was commissioned by the U.K. Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and carried out 
by an independent panel of experts in seismology, induced 
seismicity, and hydraulic fracturing. Among the recom-
mendations were that: (1) hydraulic fracturing should 
invariably include a smaller preinjection and monitoring 
stage before the main injection; (2) hydraulic fracture 
growth and direction should be monitored during opera-
tions; (3) future hydraulic fracturing operations in 
Lancashire should be subject to an effective monitoring 
system that can provide automatic locations and 
magnitudes of any seismic events in near real time. Perhaps 
most important, the report recommended that operations 
should be halted and remedial action instituted, if seismic 
events of magnitude 0.5 ML or above are detected. This 
has become known as the traffic light system [37].
In the United Kingdom hydraulic fracturing and shale 
gas did not come to mass public attention, however, until 
protests started at a drilling site in Balcombe in the south-
east of England in July 2013. Ironically the well was being 
drilled for a conventional accumulation of hydrocarbons 
(not shale) but nevertheless the site captured media 
 attention. A large number of protesters tried to stop the 
drilling. This and a heavy police presence made operations 
very difficult so the company involved eventually suspended 
drilling in August 2013.
An advantage of the concerned public reaction has been 
a more cautious approach to shale gas development (both 
in terms of environment and regulation) than in North 
America. In the United Kingdom and Poland studies of 
geological conditions before hydraulic fracturing (known 
as baselines) have been initiated. The purpose of these 
is to establish if changes have occurred that could be 
unequivocally attributed to hydraulic fracturing.
The most important of these baselines is the British 
Geological Survey (BGS) Groundwater Baseline Survey 
which looks at the natural amounts of methane in British 
groundwater in areas most likely to be developed for shale 
gas (Fig. 5). BGS has also calculated the underground 
vertical separation between aquifers that carry potable water 
and prospective shale gas layers in a series of aquifer- shale 
separation maps intended for the guidance of planners, 
policy makers and shale gas exploration companies.
As was seen at Balcombe in the United Kingdom, even 
with a well- developed regulatory and licensing system for 
oil and gas and with exploration licenses and planning 
permissions in place, protests by local people can make 
operations difficult, or impossible. Sociologists and econo-
mists refer to general acceptance on the part of the public 
that a new technology can and should proceed, as social 
license. This has proved difficult to obtain for shale gas 
companies operating in some parts of Europe.
The nature of the extraction technique of hydraulic 
fracturing and the fact that it operates deep underground 
in an environment that for many people is unfamiliar 
may mean that more effort may have to be made in 
educating and informing the affected public. In modern 
democracies, the trend is toward ever increasing informa-
tion and data availability often through the internet. Many 
people want to know precisely about the activities that 
might go on under their land or houses. This trend is 
often at odds, however, with the culture of oil and gas 
companies which will tend not to provide information 
about operations – often because they do not think it is 
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necessary, or because there are matters of commercial 
advantage at stake. For example, a company may not want 
to reveal the precise contents of its hydraulic fracturing 
fluid because it believes that this fluid gives the company 
a particular commercial advantage over other companies. 
In the United States, the so- called “Halliburton loophole” 
has excused companies from disclosing all the materials 
that they use in their hydraulic fracturing fluids. However 
this is changing as companies realize that a crucial part 
of obtaining a social license is to be fully open in the 
activities and materials involved in hydraulic fracturing.
It may be however that to get social license for unfa-
miliar extraction techniques or any subsurface usage (e.g., 
deep geological radioactive disposal) may require a more 
radical approach. Recently it has been proposed that full 
disclosure of materials and activities should be accompa-
nied by monitoring and measurement of a wide range 
of environmental variables, for example groundwater qual-
ity and air quality – and that the data so derived should 
be made open and available in real time for anyone to 
see [38]. The kind of monitoring involved could include 
seismic and groundwater monitoring, down hole sensors, 
Figure 5. A survey of methane in groundwater for Britain will establish what the natural methane levels are before any shale gas extraction. British 
Geological Survey © NERC 2014. Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown Copyright and database rights 2014.
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and other down hole techniques such as electrical resistiv-
ity tomography, as as remote sensing. In the United States 
and Canada, dedicated websites already provide this in- 
depth information to allow the public to peruse local 
energy extraction activities and their effects on the 
environment.
A good example is the Alberta Government’s Oil Sands 
Information Portal. Oil sands have only recently been con-
sidered to be part of the world’s oil reserves, as higher oil 
prices and new technology enable profitable extraction and 
processing. The oil sands of Athabasca are among the most 
controversial in the world in relation to the environmental 
effects of their exploitation. Environmentalists’ concerns relate 
to CO2 emissions of the process by which they extracted, 
other non- CO2 air pollutant emissions, the use of water in 
processing, the effect of exploitation on ground and surface 
water, and the long- term effects on landscape, wildlife and 
ecology. The oil sands are also a huge resource of oil, but 
many Albertans and other Canadians are uneasy about the 
effects of mining on the environment. The Oil Sands 
Information Portal provides environmental information on 
the web, as far as possible in real time, to show the effects 
(if any) of the processes of extraction on the environment 
including information on the mines and tailings ponds, and 
air and water quality. Another example dealing with shale 
gas and the environment (albeit on a smaller scale) includes 
Colorado Water Watch (CWW), a real- time groundwater 
monitoring pilot program for shale gas sites.
Conclusions
The technology of shale gas is well developed and has 
made a huge impact in the United States and is making 
an impact in Canada. Whether shale gas extraction makes 
an impact elsewhere in the world depends largely on the 
applicability of technology developed in U.S. shale layers 
to shale layers outside the United States, and perhaps 
more importantly on the public attitude to shale gas.
The technology developed in the Barnett shale was quickly 
adapted for widely different shales in the United States 
This was helped by a generally entrepreneurial oil and gas 
culture, by subsurface ownership rules favorable to rapid 
development, and by a buoyant gas market – at least in 
the early years of shale gas. The variety of shale types that 
have been successfully exploited already within the United 
States is probably comparable to the amount of variety 
that drilling companies will encounter elsewhere in the 
world and so it is not unreasonable to imagine that U.S. 
techniques will quickly adapt to new conditions.
However, as noted before, many prospective areas in 
Europe, for example, are densely populated and so shale 
gas extraction will require very high levels of environmental 
assurance to gain a social license. This is probably a more 
intractable problem than that of technology and may need 
radical solutions, for example, increasing levels of trans-
parency in operations, including full public disclosure of 
data relating to extraction.
The cost of gaining a social license will likely be high in 
Europe, and seen against the falling prices of oil and gas, 
may make commercial investment less attractive and more 
challenging for industry both in Europe and the United States
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